Empirical research of online auctions has grown dramatically in recent years. Studies using publicly available bid data from such websites as eBay.com have found many divergences of bidding behavior and auction outcomes compared with ordinary offline auctions and auction theory. Among the main differences between online and offline auctions are the former's longer duration, anonymity of bidders and sellers, and low barriers of entry. All of these factors lead to dynamics in the bid arrival and price process that change throughout the auction. In this work we examine the price process in a large and diverse set of eBay auctions, for both low-and high-valued items, in terms of item, auction, bidder, and seller characteristics. We propose a family of differential equation models that captures online auction dynamics. In particular, we show that a second-order linear differential equation well approximates the dynamics that occur in our diverse set of auctions. We also introduce a multiple-comparisons test for comparing dynamic models of auction subpopulations, which we use to compare subpopulations of auctions grouped by characteristics of the auction, item, seller, and bidders. We find that price dynamics change throughout the auction and are influenced mostly by factors that affect the level of uncertainty about the outcome (e.g., seller rating, item condition) and the level of competitiveness (e.g., early bidding, number of bids). We accomplish the modeling tasks within the framework of principal differential analysis and functional data models.
INTRODUCTION
Online auctions have become a major player in providing electronic commerce services. EBay (www.eBay.com), the largest consumer-to-consumer auction site, enables a global community of buyers and sellers to interact and trade with one another. After fewer than 10 years in existence, it already sees more than $24 billion worth of transactions annually (http://investor.ebay.com/annuals.cfm). Online auctions differ from their offline counterparts in their duration (typically several days), anonymity of participants (bidders and sellers do not know each other's identity), low barriers of entry (all it takes to place a bid on eBay is a valid credit card or a verified Paypal account), global reach, and around-the-clock availability.
Although online auctions have become a serious competitor to offline auctions, they also create new phenomena that depart from and cannot be explained by classical auction theory. These phenomena are related to the bidding process and lead to drastic variability in the bidding dynamics. According to classical auction theory, the final price of an auction is determined by a priori information about the number of bidders, their valuation, and the auction format. But there is increasing evidence that what occurs during the auction also matters. For instance, Easley and Tenorio (2004) found that jump bidding is an effective strategy in winning an auction. Related studies on the role of the starting bid and the bid increment (e.g., Bapna, Goes, and Gupta 2003; Mithas and Jones 2006) have found that both have a significant effect on the final price. Similarly, bid timing and auction entry matter (Borle, Boatwright, and Kadane 2006) , and the information revealed during the auction has a significant effect on its outcome (Koppius 2002) . Moreover, there is an increasing notion that the auction process itself has social value for its participants (e.g., entertainment, competition) (Smith Shanshan Wang is Senior Statistician, Modeling and Analytical Services, DemandTec Inc., San Carlos, 1989). One prominent example of changing auction dynamics is the prevalence of "last-minute bidding" or "bid sniping" documented by several researchers (Ockenfels and Roth 2006; Roth and Ockenfels 2002; Bajari and Hortacsu 2003, 2004) . One can think of bid sniping as a "burst" of energy transpiring from one or more bidding parties in an attempt to "steal away" the auctioned item in a last-moment effort. This results in a drastic change in the auction dynamics, that is, in the speed at which the price moves and the rate at which new bids arrive.
These and other documented patterns suggest that online auctions experience and exhibit new behaviors that occur during the auction and are not explained by classical auction theory. On the one hand, for those behaviors that we observe directly (e.g., jump bidding and bid sniping), we do not observe what motivates or causes them. For instance, we cannot observe why bidders engage in bid sniping. On the other hand, other behaviors are not directly observable (e.g., entertainment value, competitiveness). For example, bidders' competitiveness might result in "auction fever," with one outbidding the other over and over again. Although we are notable to observe the factors that motivate bidders to act in this competitive way, we are able to observe the result: an increased speed of price movement and bid placement. In other words, although many of the underlying factors that drive bidders' behavior are unobservable, auction dynamics can capture many of their resulting effects. In that sense, we set out to develop a formal machinery to capture and model online auction dynamics.
Recent evidence suggests that dynamics exist, that they vary from auction to auction, and that they matter. For example, Shmueli and Jank (2008) found that different opening bid levels are associated with different price dynamics. Moreover, Jank and Shmueli (2008) found that price processes, even for auctions for an identical good, fall into one of three groups, each of which exhibits different dynamics. (See also Reddy and Dass 2006 for similar results in auctions for contemporary Indian art.) When considering the dynamics of bid timings, Shmueli, Russo, and Jank (2007) showed that the bid arrival process changes during an auction with three stages of varying arrival intensity. Additional evidence for a change in the bid arrival process has been provided by Roth and Ockenfels (2002) who observed a change in last-minute bidding activity. Bapna, Goes, Gupta, and Jin (2004) reported several types of bidder strategies that affect the number and timing of bids that bidders place during an auction. And, finally, Wang, Jank, and Shmueli (2007) showed that price dynamics, when incorporated into a forecasting model, can lead to real-time predictions of price in ongoing auctions and result in higher accuracy compared with classical forecasting methods.
To capture the dynamics of an online auction, we use a functional data analysis framework in which we assume that observed bids are realizations from an underlying continuous price process. Functional data analysis (FDA) has become popular in recent years (see, e.g., Ramsay and Silverman 2002, 2005) . In FDA, the interest centers around a set of curves, shapes, images, or, more generally, a set of functional objects. In the auction context, our object of interest is the price curve. To illustrate this, consider Figure 1 , which shows price curves from 190 7-day eBay auctions for Xbox play stations and Harry Potter books. (Details of these data are deferred to Sec. 2.1.) We consider these 190 curves a sample from a much larger population of online auction price processes. Our goal is to model the population dynamics and compare processes across different subpopulations. To do this, we directly model price dynamics. (By dynamics, we mean the speed of price increases and the rate at which this speed changes.) FDA is a powerful tool for analyzing processes that exhibit changing dynamics. It is especially useful in situations where repeat observations of the same (or similar) process exist. There have been several successful applications of FDA to the study of process dynamics. Ramsay, Munhall, Gracco, and Ostry (1996) studied variation in lip motion using a functional version of ANOVA and showed that there are important sources of intersyllable variation and that intersyllabic effects are strongly time-variant. Figure 1 . Price curves (on the log-scale) for 190 closed 7-day auctions of Xbox play stations and Harry Potter books. Ramsay and Ramsey (2001) analyzed the dynamics of monthly production indexes, whereas Kargin and Onatski (2004) studied the dynamic nature of interest rates. Finally Ramsay, Bock, and Gasser (1995) studied height acceleration in human growth.
In this work we focus on a functional version of differential equations called principal differential analysis (PDA), introduced by Ramsay (2000) . The basics of PDA have been described in detail by Ramsay and Silverman (2005) . We show that price dynamics in online auctions are well captured by a single family of differential equation models. In doing so, we also propose a new test for multiple comparisons of differential equation models. Our test shows that auction subpopulations can be quite heterogeneous, especially when considering different product, auction, seller, or bidder characteristics.
Our work has several practical implications. As pointed out earlier, dynamics capture many of the otherwise unobservable behaviors during an online auction. In that sense, our work pioneers the formal modeling of dynamic bidding phenomena, such as "auction fever" and "bidding frenzy." Moreover, knowledge about auctions with different dynamics allows bidders to make more informed bidding decisions by, for example, choosing to participate in auctions that have low anticipated end dynamics. Knowledge of what drives dynamics also can help the seller in designing better auctions and can help the auctioneer make adjustments that change the auction experience (by, e.g., controlling bid increment policies to alleviate the commonly experienced "bidding droughts" in the middle of the auction).
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in this study and the data preparation steps. Section 3 describes the differential equation model, model estimation, and model validation and introduces a new multiplecomparisons test for principal differential analysis. Section 4 presents the results of fitting differential equations to online auction data and discusses insights and implications. Section 5 concludes with some further remarks.
DATA AND EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS

Online Auction Data
The data used in this study consist of closed 7-day auctions on eBay.com for two different products: Microsoft Xbox gaming systems and Harry Portter and the Half-Blood Prince books. The Xbox systems were popular items on eBay at the time of data collection and had a market value of $179.98 (based on Amazon.com). The Harry Potter books also were very popular items and sold for $27.99 on Amazon.com. In that sense, we can consider the Xbox systems as high-valued items and can contrast them with the lower-valued Harry Potter books.
For each auction, we collected the bid history, which reveals the temporal order and magnitude of bids and forms the basis of our differential equation model. Figure 2 shows a typical bid history for an Xbox auction. We see that bids arrive at irregularly spaced times. Whereas the bid-density is low during some periods (e.g., in the middle of the auction), it can be very high during other periods (e.g., in the beginning or at the end). Every auction in our data set resulted in a sale. In addition to the bid history, we also collected information on a wide variety of other auction characteristics, such as the opening bid and the final price, the number of bids, and the seller and bidder ratings. Table 1 gives summary statistics of these continuous variables. We also recorded item condition (used vs. new), whether or not the seller set a secret reserve price, and whether or not the auction exhibited early bidding or jump bidding. Table 2 gives summaries for these categorical variables.
We can see that auctions vary considerably in many respects. For instance, whereas some auctions only receive 2 bids, others receive as many as 75 bids. Also, Xbox auctions receive on average a considerably larger number of bids than Harry Potter auctions, which speaks to the greater popularity of this product. The variation in the opening bid is intriguing, because it has been found to have a direct and indirect effect on price (Bapna, Jank, and Shmueli 2008) . The opening bid is positively associated with final prices in that higher-valued items often see higher opening bids. But its indirect influence has the opposite direction: Lower opening bids attract more bidders, and the increased competition often results in a higher price. We also note that the magnitude of the opening bid depends on the value of the item; the average opening bid is $36.22 for Xbox, but only $4.13 for Harry Potter. As for seller ratings, they vary between 0 and almost 10,000. On eBay, a seller's rating is associated with trust; higher-rated sellers tend to extract price premiums due to their higher trust levels. It is interesting to see that the average seller rating is lower for (the higher-valued item) Xbox than for (the lower-valued) Harry Potter. This may be an indication of the existence of "obscure" merchants attempting to make a quick profit at the expense of consumers. A similar observation was made by Shmueli and Jank (2005) , who found that the highest frequency of fraudulent sellers can be found in categories in which the stakes (i.e., the price) are high. And finally, bidder ratings (as measures of experience) vary between 0 and almost 800 in our data. We expect more experienced bidders to make "smarter," or more strategic, bidding decisions. It is again interesting to note that Harry Potter auctions feature more experienced bidders. We also see from Table 2 that in only 2% of all auctions did the seller set a secret reserve price. Secret reserve prices act as an insurance for he or she seller in that he or she is not obligated to sell if the price does not exceed the reserve price. The magnitude of the secret reserve price is not revealed to bidders. It has been found that imposing a reserve price on the one hand leads to increased revenue (in the event that the object is sold), but on the other hand also lowers the likelihood of selling the object (see Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, and Reeves 2007; Octavian 2006) . Secret reserve prices are very rare in our data: only one Harry Potter and four Xbox auctions use that option. This rarity hinders our ability to statistically assess the effect of the presence of secret reserve prices. We also note that almost 70% of all items are used items (in particular, >90% of all Xbox auctions are used.) This has potential implications for the price dynamics, because used items have more price uncertainty. More directly related to the price dynamics are the phenomena of early bidding and jump bidding. An auction with early bidding is defined here as one that sees at least one bid within the first 1.5 days (see Wang et al. 2007) . Almost half of our auctions experience early bidding, which means that prices are increased early in many auctions. Moreover, early bidding is much more prevalent in Xbox auctions. Early bidding often is used as a strategy to establish a bidder's sincere interest and to deter other bidders. This strategy appears to be more common in the higher-valued Xbox auctions.
We also include information about jump bidding. Toward that end, we must first define what exactly constitutes a "jump bid." Little previous investigation has been done on this. Easley and Tenorio (2004) studied jump bidding as a strategy in ascending auctions and defined jump bids as bid increments that are larger than the minimum increment required by the auctioneer (see Isaac, Salmon, and Zillante 2002; Daniel and Hirshleifer 1998) . Bid increments larger than the minimum increment are relatively common on eBay. Thus we focus on increments that result in a very unusual "jump" in a statistical sense. To define "unusual," we first examine differences in bid magnitudes between pairs of consecutive bids. These differences depend on the scale (i.e., the value of the item), and thus we consider relative differences (i.e., relative to the average final price). The distribution of these relative differences is highly skewed, with most <30% (see Wang et al. 2007 for more details). Thus we define a jump bid as a bid that is at least 30% higher than the previous bid.
The unusual nature of a jump bid is that it increases the price by an amount much greater than the required bid increment. There are different theories as to why a bidder would use jump bidding. One explanation is that by jump bidding, bidders emphasize their determination to win an auction and deter competing bidders. In our data, almost 20% of all auctions experience jump bidding. Jump bidding is much more prevalent in the Harry Potter auctions. This may be related to the larger proportion of used items in the Xbox auctions, which are associated with higher price uncertainty. This uncertainty may discourage bidders from placing jump bids.
Data Preprocessing
eBay auctions are second-price auctions, in which the winner is the highest bidder, but he or she pays the second highest bid (plus an increment). eBay requests that bidders submit their "proxy bid," the highest amount that they are willing to pay for the item. eBay's automated bidding system records the proxy bid but displays only an increment above the second highest proxy bid during the ongoing auction. The final bid data that are publicly available on eBay's website are proxy bids, which thus are not equivalent to the price shown during the auction. From a conceptual standpoint, the proxy bids are not the information that bidders see and react to during the actual ongoing auction. For this reason, we first reconstruct the "live bids" (i.e., the price shown during the live auction, equal to the second highest proxy bid plus an increment) using eBay's bid increment table (http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/bid-increments.html). Figure 3 shows the difference between live and proxy bids for a sample auction. Here "+" denote proxy bids, solid circles denote the corresponding live bids, and the dashed line shows the live bid function, which represents the price shown at every point during the auction. This is a step function with steps at the times of the placed bids. R code for transforming proxy bids into a live bid step function is available online at www.smith.umd.edu/ceme/statistics/code.html.
The next step, using the live bids as our object of interest, is to recover the underlying price curve and its dynamics. We accomplish this by presmoothing the data (Ramsay and Silverman 2005) . Using the live bids as our basis, we use smoothing techniques to create the functional object. Let y
The bid values are transformed into log-scores to better capture common price surges, especially toward the end of auction. Note that because the bids arrive at irregularly spaced times, the t ij 's (and the n i 's) vary from auction to auction. To account for the irregular spacing, we sample the raw data at a common set of time points t j , 0 ≤ t j ≤ 7, j = 1, . . . , n. Thus the observed live bid curve for auction i can be represented by a vector of fixed length n, where t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) and y (j ) i = y i (t j ) denotes the value of the bid sampled at time t j .
To arrive at a smooth representation, we approximate Y i by a linear combination of basis functions. We write
where the error term i (t) is assumed to be the only source of roughness for an otherwise smooth object. Using an appropriate basis functions expansion, we can represent f i (t) as
for a set of known basis functions Green and Silverman (1994) showed that for Lt = f (t),ĉ is given byĉ
where c is the n × K basis matrix, Y (t) is the n × N matrix of responses, and λ is a smoothing parameter that controls the trade-off between data fit and smoothness. Note that the elements of K are given by K kl = c k (t)c l (t) dt (see Ramsay and Silverman 2005) . In this work we use B-splines of order 6 to allow for reliable estimation of at least the first three derivatives of f . The selection of the knots is relative to the bid arrival rate (see Shmueli et al. 2007 ). Some bids arrive early, few bids arrive during mid-auction, and most bids arrive at the end of the auction. The selection of the knots reflects this arrival distribution. The choice of the smoothing parameter is driven by visual inspection of the resulting functional objects. We also conduct a sensitivity analysis (see the App.), which suggests that our results are stable across different knots and smoothing parameter choices. Figure 4 (a) shows the functional objects for the 190 auctions in our data set. In what follows, we refer to these objects simply as the "price curves." One advantage of having smooth functional objects is that estimates for their dynamics can be readily obtained through their derivatives. The first and second derivatives of the price curve correspond to the price velocity and price acceleration. Figure 4 (b) shows that most price velocities are close to 0, especially during mid-auction. Note that for some auctions, price velocities are below 0 during mid-auction due to the smoothing splines' inability to reflect long periods of a constant price, as occur in auctions that receive very few bids during mid-auction. This issue is related to the recent work of James and Zhu (2007) , who developed a new approach for rendering the output of functional data analyses more interpretable. Thus negative velocity should be interpreted here as essentially zero velocity. A near-0 price velocity implies a process that is moving very slowly. In comparison, velocities can be very high at the start of the auction and especially at the end. Yet despite these overall trends in the data, Figure 4 also shows quite large variation on an individual level. For instance, whereas price acceleration is positive (and increases) toward the end for some auctions, it is negative for others. A negative acceleration (= deceleration) characterizes auctions for which the price movement has slowed down significantly. In what follows, we use phase-plane plots (PPPs) to investigate differences among auction dynamics more carefully. The insight gained from this investigation then provides the starting point for our subsequent modeling.
Exploratory Analysis Through Phase Plane Plots
As a preliminary step toward arriving at a suitable differential equation model, graphs (similar to scatterplots) that plot the derivative of one order versus the derivative of another order often are studied. These plots are often called PPPs. In the functional context, in which repeat observations exist at each derivative level, the average derivatives typically are graphed against one another, for instance, the average acceleration versus the average velocity (see see Ramsay and Silverman 2005) .
Note that in subsequent investigations, we show the results of three different analyses: one in which we analyze the combined data of both Harry Potter and Xbox auctions (also called the "mixed" data, because it mixes high-value and low-value items), and two additional analyses, one for each item separately. The reason for analyzing the combined data is to explore effects that are independent of the value of the item. But as Tables 1 and 2 show, high-valued (Xbox) and low-valued (Harry Potter) auctions differ in many characteristics (e.g., opening bid, winning bid, seller rating, jump bidding), and thus we contrast the combined analysis with two "single" analyses in which we study each item separately. In what follows, we denote these three analyses by solid lines for the combined data, dashed lines for the Harry Potter data, and dotted lines for the Xbox data. Figure 5 shows a PPP for the average second derivative of price (or price acceleration) versus the average first derivative (or price velocity). The numbers along the curve indicate the day of the auction (for 7-day auctions). Although only 8 discrete time points are marked on the curve, it is computed continuously using the (continuous) average velocity and average acceleration curves and thus no binning by day occurs. We can see that the price velocity is high at the beginning of the auction (days 0-1). At this point, it takes an instantaneous "burst of energy" to overcome the opening bid (which can be very high). After this initial burst, the dynamics slow down, the price acceleration is negative, and because changes in acceleration precede changes in velocity, we observe a consequent slowdown in the price speed. This slowdown continues until about day 4, after which the dynamics reverse; acceleration turns positive and leads to an increase in velocity. In fact, price increases quite rapidly until the end of the auction. Figure 5 has several interesting features. First, the PPP's "C" shape is typical of an online auction; a phase of decreased dynamics followed by a transitional phase of change, and finally a phase of increased dynamics. Our subsequent analyses show that these three phases are typical of an online auction in general. But we also show that the magnitude/importance of each phase varies significantly, depending on different auction characteristics. Figure 5 also shows that this C-shape is the same, at least qualitatively, for both low-valued (Harry Potter) and highvalued (Xbox) auctions; however, we also note that the range of dynamics is larger in high-valued items, indicating more price activity between the start and the end of the auction.
We now consider a series of conditional PPPs (Fig. 6) , where the average derivatives are conditional on the auction characteristics described in Tables 1 and 2 . We conduct a series of pairwise comparisons in the sense that we compare a conditional PPP with a certain feature with one without that feature. More details on the individual features, are given in Table 3 . For instance, the two rightmost graphs in the third row contrast PPPs for auctions with many bids versus those with few bids. We see that, as noted earlier, the general C-shape of both PPPs is equivalent; however, the magnitude of the dynamics is very different. For auctions with few bids, the range of dynamics is significantly smaller, especially at the auction start. In particular, the price velocity is lower at the start and, as a consequence, does not decrease as fast as in auctions with many bids. Interestingly, toward mid-auction (at day 4), the dynamics of both types of auctions turn identical, but then again diverge toward the auction end, when auctions with many bids exhibit larger acceleration. The different size of the C-shape also indicates that the magnitude of the relationship between velocity and acceleration differs. Whereas in auctions with many bids, small changes in acceleration have a large effect on velocity, this effect is less pronounced in auctions with few bids.
In what follows, we summarize the most important insights illustrated in Figure 6 . First, for item value, we find that highvalued items have a larger range of dynamics compared with lower-valued items. One possible explanation is that the default opening bid on eBay equals $0.01 regardless of the item's value. This means that the price of a higher-valued item must travel a larger distance (within the same 7-day time period) to reach the final price. More evidence for this is also provided in Tables 1 and 2 , which show that for a Harry Potter auction, the median opening price ($4.00) is 33% of its median winning bid ($11.50), whereas for an Xbox auction, the median opening price it is less than 20% of the median winning bid.
A second observation is that the effect of item condition (new vs. used) depends on the item value. Whereas the range of dynamics is the same for used and new Harry Potter auctions, the range is much larger among new items for the higher-valued Xbox auctions. Even though our data contain only eight Xbox auctions for new items (thus calling its statistical significance into question), this effect may be caused by the increased price uncertainty of used items; bidders, uncertain about the true value of a used item, bid more cautiously on high-valued items, causing only moderate price movements.
Early bidding has a strong effect on price dynamics. In fact, for auctions without early bidding, the typical C-shape is not seen, and price dynamics remain extremely low for most of the auction, growing only moderately during the last day. In contrast, in auctions with early bidding, price velocity is very high early in the auction. It is interesting to note that there are no apparent differences in the effect of early bidding for low-valued versus high-valued items.
Another effect, related to early bidding, is that of jump bidding. As for early bidding, auctions that do not experience a jump bid see a smaller range of price dynamics. But, unlike for early bidding, the effect of jump bidding differs between high-valued and low-valued items; jump bids have a stronger effect in high-valued auctions. One reason for this may be that the stakes in high-valued auctions are higher, causing more extreme price movements. We also note that the effect of jump bidding differs mostly at the auction end. This can be a sign of the more competitive nature for Xbox auctions with price wars and other competitive actions between bidders occurring at the auction end.
As mentioned earlier, the existence of a secret reserve price has a large effect on price dynamics. But because there is a total of only 5 auctions (4 Xbox and 1 Harry Potter) with a secret reserve price in our sample, the generalizability of this result is questionable. Another factor with a strong effect on dynamics is the number of bids. Not surprisingly, auctions with few bids also experience little dynamics. It also is interesting to note that for auctions with many bids, the price deceleration between day 0 and day 4 is much faster than the subsequent price acceleration after day 4. This is evidence that the increment per bid is greater in the earlier stages of an auction and much smaller later on.
The opening bid appears to have a huge impact on the price dynamics. Auctions with high opening bids barely experience any dynamics. This is not surprising, because a high opening bid drains all of the energy out of the auction by not leaving much room for additional price movements. Among auctions with a low opening bid, the effect is stronger for high-valued auctions. This again may be a manifestation of the three-way effect between the opening bid, the number of bidders, and price; a lower opening bid attracts more bidders and thus results in greater price dynamics.
For the winning bid, the picture is somewhat different. Auctions with both high and low winning bids achieve a comparable level of price dynamics. This is interesting because it confirms that dynamics are not a function only of the final price but rather other, price-external factors exist that also play a role.
The final effects that we discuss are those of the seller and bidder rating. We note that a higher seller rating results in somewhat larger price dynamics, especially for low-valued items. Lower-rated sellers are trusted less, and as a consequence, bidders might bid more cautiously, trying to avoid rapid price movements. The picture is somewhat more diffuse for bidder ratings. As pointed out earlier, a bidder's rating often is taken as a proxy for his or her experience. For the highvalued item, there does not appear to be a difference in price dynamics between bidders with different levels of experience. In contrast, for the low-valued item, the dynamics are somewhat slower for low-experienced bidders. This finding may reflect a general strategy of experienced bidders to make the price move rapidly, even in auctions where the stakes are low.
In summary, the exploratory analysis presented in this section demonstrates that dynamics exist, that they matter, and that they are quite different from one auction to another. Moreover, some of the variation in dynamics appears to be driven by characteristics that are observable, such as characteristics of the product, the auction, the seller, or the bidder. We also find that although dynamics vary, the general functional relationship between acceleration and velocity is the same C-shape for almost all auctions. The difference lies in the magnitude of that relationship. We take this to suggest that dynamics in online auctions can be captured using a single family of models. In what follows, we derive dynamic models based on PDA and discuss a particular class of models suitable for online auction dynamics.
THE DIFFERENTIAL EQUATION MODEL
Because of differential equation models' relative novelty in statistical modeling, we begin with a summary of how these models are formulated, estimated, and evaluated in the functional setting (Secs 3.1 and 3.2). More details have been given by Ramsay and Silverman (2005, chaps. 13 and 14) . We then move to a discussion of a particular model that is suitable for the auction context (Sec. 3.3), and then end with a new test for comparing models of auction subpopulations (Sec. 3.4).
Model Formulation and Estimation
Let y i be the price function for auction i (i = 1, . . . , N) , and let D m y i be the mth derivative of y i . Our goal is to identify a linear differential operator (LDO) of the form 
An important motivation for finding the operator L is substantive. Applications in the physical sciences, engineering, biology, and elsewhere often make extensive use of differential equation models of the form Ly i = f i . The function f i , often called a forcing or impulse function, indicates the influence of exogenous agents on the system defined by Ly = 0. Returning to the online auction setting, we reason that variation in price is due to variation in the forces resulting from bid placement and bid timing, and that these forces have a direct or proportional impact on the acceleration of the price process.
In practice, due to the prevalence of noise, it is virtually impossible to find a model that satisfies (7) exactly. Thus principal differential analysis adopts a least squares approach to the fitting of the differential equation model. The fitting criterion is to minimize the sum of squared norms,
over all possible models L. Note that identifying L is equivalent to identifying the m weight functions, ω j , that define the linear differential equation in (6). There are generally two approaches to estimating the weight functions ω j . The first, pointwise minimization, yields pointwise estimates of the weight functions ω j by minimizing the (pointwise) fitting criterion,
The pointwise approach can pose problems, especially if the ω j 's are estimated at a fine level of detail. An alternative approach, which is computationally more efficient, is to use basis expansions. Taking that approach, we approximate each weight function ω j by a linear combination of basis functions, φ k , say, ω j ≈ k c jk φ k , where c jk denotes basis function coefficients. Using this expansion, we can approximate SSE PDA (L) in (8) as a quadratic form that can be minimized using standard numerical techniques (for more details, see Ramsay and Silverman 2005; Ramsay 1996 ).
Model Fit
An initial impression of the model fit can be obtained through visualization. If the model represents the data well, then the identified differential operator L should be effective at annihilating variation in the y i . This can be visualized by plotting the empirical forcing functions, Ly i . If the plotted Ly i 's are small and mainly noiselike, then the model provides a good data fit. As a point of reference for the magnitude of the Ly i 's, we use the size of the D m y i 's, because these are the empirical forcing functions corresponding to ω 0 = · · · = ω m−1 = 0.
To confirm a visual impression, the quality of fit also can be gauged by more quantitative statistics. In the differential equation context, this can be done through the pointwise error sum of squares, PSSE L (t), in (9). A logical baseline against which to compare PSSE L is the error sum of squares, in which we set ω j = 0 so that the comparison is simply with the sum of squares of D m y i , which is analogous to the classical sum of squares in ANOVA,
Thus we can assess the model fit of the differential equation by examining the pointwise squared multiple correlation function,
and the pointwise F -ratio,
A Second-Order Linear Differential Equation Model
We now discuss in further detail a special case of the foregoing general differential equation model: the second-order linear differential equation. We focus particularly on second-order differential equations because our exploratory analyses in Section 2.3 indicated varying relationships between the first and second derivatives of price. Moreover, from a model parsimony standpoint, differential equation models of lower order are preferred a priori over models of higher order. Consider the general second-order differential equation
Setting ω 0 = 0, we get
which describes a strictly monotone, twice-differentiable function (Ramsay 1998) . Given that the live bid is monotonically increasing, (14) appears to be a reasonable candidate for online auctions. From here on, for ease of notation, we write ω = ω 1 and ω * = −ω.
Data Simulation.
To investigate the appropriateness of this class of models for the auction context, we simulate data from the foregoing monotone second-order linear differential equation and compare it with observed auction data. The goal is to investigate whether the class of models in (14) produces data (price curves, price velocities, PPPs) as in Section 2.
Simulating data from (14) is done in two steps. First, we specify the time-varying weight function, ω * , by specifying an overall linear trend (intercept a = −1.6; slope b = .4) to mimic a monotonic increasing weight function, as well as local deviations from this trend using a linear combination of four Fourier basis functions. This results in the weight function depicted in Figure 7 (a). We add Gaussian noise with mean 0 and standard deviation .01. We then evaluate the model by generating solutions over an evenly spaced grid on the interval [0, 7] . The resulting 190 simulated curves are shown in Figure 7 (b). The resulting PPP of the average acceleration versus the average velocity for these simulated curves is displayed in Figure 7 (c). We see that the simulated PPP strongly resembles the observed C-shapes described in Section 2. This further supports the appropriateness of the class of differential equation models in (14) for modeling auction dynamics. 
Model Interpretation.
The coefficient function ω * = −ω = D 2 y/Dy measures the relative curvature of the monotone function in the sense that it assesses the size of the curvature of D 2 y relative to the slope Dy. The special case of ω * = −α leads to Y (t) = C 0 + C 1 exp(αt), whose exponent has a constant curvature relative to α, whereas ω * = 0 defines a linear function. Thus small or zero values of ω * (t) correspond to locally linear functions, whereas very large values correspond to regions of sharp curvature. In mechanical systems, the latter type is generally caused by internal or external frictional forces or viscosity. In the context of online auctions, sharp curvature in the price process can be related to jump bids caused by bidders attempting to apply an external force ("deterring other bidders") to the bidding process. In contrast, ω * = 0 indicates a very slowly moving price process often observed during the middle of the auction ("bidding draught").
Multiple Comparisons for Differential Equation Models
One of the goals of the present study was to investigate whether factors related to the characteristics of the auction, item, seller, and bidders are associated with different dynamics. We therefore define J auction subpopulations with dynamic models D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D J , that correspond to groupings according to the aforementioned characteristics. For example, groupings can be defined by item value: high-valued items versus low-valued items. Another example is auctions in which jump bidding is present versus absent. Thus we are interested in testing whether the differential equation models of each of the J groups are different. Although it is somewhat similar to multiple comparisons in the classical ANOVA setting, in our case we want to test whether J population models are significantly different, rather than J population means. Therefore, our null hypothesis is H 0 : D 1 = · · · = D J versus the alternative H a : at least one of the D i 's is different. The problem that arises is that within each group, we have an associated single differential equation model, and thus there are no replications from which to estimate variances.
One possible approach is to use the functional shape test proposed by James and Sood (2006), which tests whether a functional object is equivalent to a given underlying curve. Rather than operating on mean functions as was done by James and
Sood (2006), we could compare the differential equation's coefficient functions. One important limitation of this test in our dynamic context is that it can only answer the general question: "Do two differential equation models differ?" If differences between J models exist, then the magnitude of their difference may change over different areas of the parameter space. For instance, two models might be identical for some parameter values, whereas for other values they might differ substantially. Figure 6 provides evidence that this phenomenon exists in the online auction domain, showing the relationship between acceleration and velocity (and thus the corresponding differential equation models) is similar during some time periods but very different at others.
Another difference between our context and the setup of James and Sood (2006) is that we have a multiple-sample curve comparison, whereas they dealt with testing the fit of a single curve to a hypothesized curve. Consequently, we propose a new multiple-comparisons test for comparing multiple functional objects (e.g., differential equation models) both locally and globally. The test captures not only overall curve differences, but also differences at local areas, thereby allowing one to answer such questions as "where do curves differ?" and "does this difference remain constant across the entire range of the model parameters?" Our multiple-comparisons functional test is inspired by the work of Spurrier (1999) , who considered multiple comparisons of several linear regression models. To date, most of the work on simultaneous inference and multiple comparisons has focused on comparing the means of K (≥ 3) populations. An exception is the work of Spurrier (1999) and Liu, Jamshidian, and Zhang (2004) . Spurrier considered multiple comparisons of several simple linear regression lines and derived sets of simultaneous confidence bands for all possible contrasts between several simple linear regression lines over the entire range (−∞, ∞), assuming that the design matrixes are the same. Liu et al. (2004) extended Spurrier's work to comparing multiple linear regression models with several explanatory variables and different design matrixes. In what follows, we extend the work of Spurrier (1999) and Liu et al. (2004) to multiple comparisons for differential equation models. We derive simultaneous confidence bands for several PDA models and propose a way to implement the method in practice.
A Multiple Comparison Procedure for Functional Differential Equations.
Suppose that there are J groups in the population, and let i (i = 1, . . . , J ) denote the index of ith group. Also suppose that each group can be described by a differential equation model of the form
where
is the pth differentiation operator, and e i (t) = (ε it 1 , . . . , ε it n ) T has components ε it j , j = 1, . . . , n, i = 1, . . . , J , assumed to be iid N(0, σ 2 ), independent across i and t j . Note that here we consider the special case with m = 2 and ω 0 = 0 [see eq. (14)], where the differential equation model (15) reduces to (suppressing the dependence on i)
The goal is to derive a multiple-comparisons procedure for ω(t). 
. , D p y in i (t)) T defined at every single time point t ∈ T , and let ω i (t) = (ω i 0 (t), . . . , ω i m−1 (t)) T . Then (15) can be expressed in matrix form as
Holding t fixed, the classical least squares estimator of ω i (t) iŝ
Letσ 2 denote the pooled mean squared error estimator of σ 2 with degrees of freedom ν = J i=1 (n i − m). Note that using classical linear models arguments,σ 2 is independent ofω.
The goal is to construct a set of simultaneous confidence bands for
where is an index set that determines the comparison of interest.
ij z, and the simultaneous confidence bands can be constructed as
where c is the critical constant such that the confidence level is equal to 1 − α. We can compute c through the relation P (T < c), where
Finding an analytical representation for the distribution of T is involved. In what follows, we suggest a way to approximate it through simulation. Note that significant simplifications arise in the two-group comparison. For two groups, there is no supremum in (21), and so its distribution is simply the absolute value of a t-statistic. Let P ij be a m × m nonsingular matrix such that
Let Z i be independent normal random vectors distributed as
. Then the distribution of T is the same as that of
We can then simulate a realization of the random variable T as follows:
andσ
3. Calculate
Compute T through (23).
Repeating steps 1-4 B times creates B iid replications of the random variable T , T 1 , . . . , T B . The estimateĉ of the critical constant c is then calculated as the (1 − α)Bth largest simulated value of the T i 's, that is,ĉ = T ((1−α)B) , where T (i) denotes the ordered value of T i . Equation (20) defines simultaneous confidence bands for the difference between the coefficient functions of different differential equation models weighted by the vector z with respect to specific time t. Thus for variable time, we should have a set of time-varying simultaneous confidence bands (where "simultaneous" means simultaneously comparing across all subpopulations under consideration, holding fixed a value of t); that is, when time changes, the critical value c in (20) should be a function of time t. Repeating the procedure described earlier over a fine grid t ∈ [0, 7] gives a vector of pointwise critical valueŝ
Usingĉ(t), we obtain the simultaneous confidence bands in (20) as
We consequently reject the null hypothesis that a set of models is identical if the confidence bands do not include 0. Note that the derivation of our confidence bands does not explicitly take into account noise at the raw data level. In contrast, our viewpoint is functional in that we assume that there exists an underlying smooth, continuous price process that we would like to recover. Thus we regard the raw bid data as noisy realizations from this price process and remove that noise in the smoothing step.
MODELING EBAY'S ONLINE AUCTION DATA
We now return to the auction data set. Our first goal is to evaluate whether auction dynamics can be captured by a differential equation. Thus we first estimate a model and evaluate its goodness of fit. Once such a model is established, we fit differential equations to data subpopulations and compare their dynamics by testing model differences, using the multiple-comparison test from the previous section. Next we describe each of these steps and the resulting domain insight.
eBay Dynamics
We start by fitting a differential equation to the preprocessed data described in Section 2. We initially estimate model (14) using the entire set of auctions. As in our earlier steps, we show the results for three different analyses: one analysis for the combined Harry Potter and Xbox data and two analyses for each of the two items separately. The estimated coefficient function, ω * = −ω, is displayed in Figure 8 . We see that the results for the combined data are very similar to those for the Harry Potter or Xbox data separately. This is in line with the observed similarity of the PPPs in Figure 5 and implies that overall auction dynamics are similar, regardless of the item value. Thus our next step is to investigate whether this similarity holds at a more detailed level of comparison. Figure 8 also shows that ω * has three levels of values: negative, zero, and finally positive. These levels capture and correspond to the three bidding phases during an auction: early activity, little mid-auction activity, and high late activity. The typical bidding behavior during an eBay auction starts with some early bidding, during which bidders establish their time priority. (When the two highest bids are tied, the earliest bidder is the winner.) Then comes a period of "bidding draught," when hardly any bids are placed (possibly because bidders avoid revealing their willingness to pay too early, to avoid early price increases). Finally, during the last hours of the auction, bidding picks up again and peaks dramatically during the last minutes of Figure 8 . Estimated coefficient function of the monotone second-order linear differential equation fitted to online auction data. The solid line represents the combined data for both Harry Potter and Xbox, the dashed line, to the individual data for Harry Potter; the dotted line, to individual data for Xbox. the auction. This last-moment bidding is called "sniping," and there are various explanations as to why bidders engage in it (e.g., to avoid bidding wars, because last-moment bidding does not allow other bidders to respond).
The values of ω * reflect the phases as follows. Recall that a value of 0 indicates linear motion of the price process (i.e., no dynamics), whereas large positive or negative values indicate changes in the dynamics (depressing them or increasing them). The first phase (up to day 3) is characterized by a negative ω * , with a dip on day 2. This dip marks the change from early bidding to "bidding draught," when velocity decreases, and we see that ω * = 0. From day 5 on, ω * = 0 begins to increase, turning positive and then peaking at day 6.
A few additional comments are in order before moving on. Recall the "double-S" shape of the ω * curve in Figure 8 . As we can see, this shape is typical for an online auction (modeled by a linear differential equation), similar to the C-shape observed in the PPPs, and does not change much from one auction to another. What does change, as we show in subsequent analyses, is the magnitude of this double-S, indicating larger or smaller price dynamics; its steepness, with steeper shapes resulting in a more abrupt change in dynamics; and the change points, that is, the locations at which one bidding phase changes to another. We comment on these changes in more detail in our subsequent analyses.
The fit of the differential equation model can be gauged from Figure 9 , which shows the equivalence of a residual analysis. Figure 9 (a) shows the observed price accelerations, and (b) shows the corresponding estimated forcing functions of the differential equation in (14). These two should be identical under a perfect model fit (similar to the observed and fitted observations in regression). We can see that although the fit is not perfect, the range of the forcing functions is identical to that of the observed accelerations during most of the auction. The fit is especially close in the middle and end of the auction; only the start of the auction does not seem to be captured equally as well by the differential equation model. We also see that the fit for the Harry Potter auctions is similar to that for the Xbox auctions.
Another quantification of model fit is given by the pointwise R 2 (RSQ) and F-RATIO from (11) and (12). We show the RSQ in Figure 10 ; the insight from the F-RATIO is equivalent and thus is omitted. RSQ is >.99 throughout the entire auction, indicating a very good global fit of the monotone second-order linear differential equation model (14). We see that the fit also varies; it is best at the beginning and end of the auction, but weaker during mid-auction. The fit is somewhat weaker when considering Harry Potter and Xbox separately, likely due to the smaller sample size for the separate models.
In summary, we learn that a second-order linear differential equation model fits online auction data reasonably well. It captures the three phases of bidding and the interplay of dynamics that change over the course of the auction. We also see that the degree of model fit varies at different periods of the auction. This motivates our next step, which looks at conditional models for subpopulations of auctions. Perhaps the differences between these subpopulations can explain the variability in goodness of fit. But, more importantly, our goal is to learn about the impact of different factors on the model parameters. 
Dynamics of eBay Subpopulations
To compare dynamics of auction subpopulations, we fit differential equation models separately to different auction subpopulations and test whether the resulting models are statistically different. The subpopulations of interest are described in Table 2 . The table reports results only for Harry Potter and Xbox separately, to avoid information cluttering; parameter estimates and corresponding simultaneous confidence bands are shown in Figures 11 and 12 . Because our data contain only one Harry Potter auction and only four Xbox auctions with a secret reserve price, we can analyze this feature only for the combined data. This is reported in Figure 13 . Figure 13 shows the estimated curves for Xbox and Harry Potter auctions. We see that the basic double-S shape of the estimated coefficient function ω * is very similar for both highvalued and low-valued items. But the magnitude appears to be different with a smaller magnitude for low-valued items, suggesting a smaller range of dynamics for products of lesser value (as shown in Fig. 6 ). To test whether this observed difference is statistically significant, we use the comparison procedure derived in Section 3.4. in the following way: For each pair (e.g., new vs. used; high vs. low), we computeĉ(t) in (26)-one for each pair, then compute the corresponding confidence bands. In that sense, the multiple comparisons are valid only for the two components of each pair and not across all pairs. Figure 13(c) shows the corresponding 95% confidence band for the difference (high value vs. low value) between the estimated coefficient functions. All confidence bands vary over time, emphasizing the time-varying sensitivity of our estimation procedure. As with classical confidence intervals, wider bands indicate greater uncertainty about the true difference, and if the confidence band includes the value 0, then the alternative of a population difference cannot be rejected for the time period in question (at a given significance level). Using these guidelines, we conclude that the difference between high-valued and low-valued items is insignificant for most of the auction duration, except for a short period between days 5 and 6 when auctions for high-valued items experience significantly larger price spurts. This finding is of importance for such services as automated auction updates to wireless devices, in that high-valued auctions will require more frequent updates between days 5 and 6. It is equally important to the current leader of the auction in that he or she should be aware of a greater threat of being outbid during this time period.
Next, we compare subpopulations of auctions using the factors described in Table 2 . We estimate the curves separately for low-value items (Harry Potter book) and high-value items (Xbox game console) and compare them with respect to the different factors. This analysis reveals further differences between dynamics in low-value and high-value auctions. Figure 11 displays the estimated coefficient curves for pairs of subpopulations by item value (Xbox/Harry Potter). Figure 12 displays the corresponding multiple-comparisons test in the form of 95% simultaneous confidence intervals for comparing the pairs of subpopulations. To compare the curves, we consider shape, magnitude, and phase. In terms of shape, although most curves follow the double-S shape, a few do deviate (see, e.g., the early bidding and opening bid panels in Fig. 11 ). In terms of the We also see that the differences in magnitude change over time. Finally, the double-S curves also can vary in terms of phase. We consider all of these when discussing the results for each factor and explain what we can learn from them.
Number of Bids. Coefficient curves for few and many bids appear to have the same shape, magnitude, and phases for both Harry Potter and Xbox auctions. This would seem surprising, because we would expect that having many early bids would slow later dynamics. Indeed, when we apply the pairwise comparison test (Fig. 12) , we find that for Xbox auctions there is a statistically significant difference in dynamics during the first 2 days, where, as expected, multiple bids do slow down dynamics. Item Condition. The overall shape of the coefficient curves is similar for new and used items for both the Harry Potter and Xbox auctions. But the curves differ in magnitude and in phase. New and used item curves have very different magnitudes. This difference is exactly reversed when we compare Harry Potter and Xbox auctions; used Harry Potter auctions have slower dynamics than new Harry Potters auctions at first (until day 2), but then this trend reverses and used auction dynamics speed up for a few days. The exact opposite occurs with Xbox auctions; new item prices are slower at first, only to change at around day 3 for nearly a day of faster dynamics. Also note the difference in phase, with Harry Potter dynamics changing direction earlier than Xbox dynamics.
The difference in effect of item condition on the Xbox versus Harry Potter auctions can be explained as buyers prefer new books but used game consoles. Or, more generally, in low-value auctions, new items are more desirable, whereas in high-value auctions, used items are more desirable. If we consider the time to closing of an auction, then bidders are more likely to place a bid in auctions that are closer to the closing time, unless the item is very desirable, in which case they might bid early. This explains the shift in the direction of the dynamics; bidders place bids on the less desirable item (i.e., used book or new game console) later in the auction, which translates into increased later dynamics.
Early Bidding. Auctions with early bidding appear to have different shaped coefficient curves than those with no early bidding, and this is true for both Harry Potter and Xbox auctions. In particular, the absence of early bidding manifests as slower dynamics at first, followed by increased dynamics after a day or two, compared with auctions with early bidding. This behavior is similar for both the Harry Potter and Xbox auctions, with the only difference being the phase; the switch in dynamics occurs slightly later in Harry Potter auctions.
Jump Bidding. The coefficient curves all appear similar, except in Xbox auctions that have jump bidding. The latter case exhibits volatile dynamics, especially during days 4-5. This may indicate that jump bidding affects high-value items more than low-value items and can cause unstable dynamics. Such volatility is an unwelcome feature to both bidders and seller, because it increases the levels of price uncertainty.
Opening Bid. As with item condition, curves for low and high opening bids for both the Harry Potter and Xbox auctions all have a similar shape. Using the multiple-comparisons test, we find that the apparent difference in magnitude is insignificant. This finding is also curious in light of our earlier observations from Figure 6 , yet it suggests that, statistically, the effect of the opening bid on dynamics is benign.
Winning Bid. Coefficient curves have the same shape for high versus low winning bids for both the Harry Potter and Xbox auctions. The differences appear to be in magnitude when comparing high and low opening bids. Whereas low-opening bid auctions appear similar for the Harry Potter and Xbox auctions, for high-winning bid auctions, the direction of the effect on the Harry Potter and Xbox auctions is reversed. For Harry Potter, high-winning bid auctions have faster dynamics than low-winning bid auctions at around days 2-3. The opposite is true for Xbox auctions. This again can be explained in terms of item desirability; the expensive books and the cheaper game consoles are more desirable and thus attract more early bidding in the auction.
Seller Rating. High seller rating appears to lead to lowmagnitude coefficient curves for both the Harry Potter and Xbox auctions, whereas low rating curves are more volatile. Whereas in the Xbox auctions the differences are not significant, in the Harry Potter auctions low seller ratings lead to volatile dynamics (especially at the start and middle of the auction), which again may reflect the increased uncertainty in the presence of a low-rated seller.
Bidder Rating. Although coefficient curves for low-rated and high-rated bidders have a similar shape, they differ in magnitude and in timing. For the Harry Potter auctions, low-rated bidders generate more dynamics at the start and end of the auction, whereas high-rated bidders are more active in mid-auction. In the Xbox auctions, high-rated bidders also generate midauction dynamics, and low-rated bidders are active at the auction end. One possible explanation of this is that more experienced (i.e., higher-rated) bidders have a tendency to establish their presence earlier, especially in auctions where the stakes (i.e., the values) are higher. Consequently, this may deter other bidders from entering (or continuing) in the same auction.
In conclusion, it appears that different characteristics of the auction, the item, the bidders, and the seller lead to different price dynamics that change at different points in the auction and at different magnitudes. The timing and magnitude of the switching from early bidding to bidding draught, and from bidding draught to high-frequency late bidding, can differ when such factors as item condition are considered. Price dynamics indicate that item desirability leads to different dynamics; for low-valued items, bidders prefer "better" items in terms of item condition and winning price (as a proxy for quality), whereas for high-valued items, desirable features are "lesser" (used and low winning price). The desirability in turn affects the timing when bidders place bids, which manifests in dynamics of varying magnitude at different times during the auction. Another important issue is uncertainty. Factors that increase the level of uncertainty, such as low-rated sellers and jump bidding, can result in volatile dynamics. Such behavior is unfavorable to both bidders and sellers, and auctioneers might want to use strategies to alleviate such scenarios.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In this work we use linear differential equations to model to the price process and its dynamics in online auctions, using a diverse data set of eBay auctions for Xbox play stations and Harry Potter books. We show that a monotone second-order linear differential equation model describes the relationship between the price and its dynamics well. We also explore the effect of different auction subpopulations on the dynamics and find that although auctions generally adhere to a three-phase process of price dynamics (early bidding, bidding draught, and bid sniping), certain subpopulations differ in terms of the timing and magnitude of changes in dynamics.
Sellers, bidders, and auctioneers alike can learn from differential equation models what to expect about the price process and auction dynamics. Sellers can use information about price dynamics to improve their choices of auction setting that are under their control (e.g., the opening bid, secret reserve price), while taking into account their seller rating. Bidders can benefit from better-informed decisions about what auctions to bid on and when to place their bids. Auctioneers can make use of the price dynamics model in several ways; to adjust auction and technological parameters that affect dynamics (change, e.g., the bid increment magnitude, the order in which auctions are displayed, or advertising strategies), they can advise sellers on strategies to increase price dynamics of their auction, and they can use this method to spot anomalous behavior indicative of possible fraud, such as shilling. In short, a model that captures price dynamics can be beneficial to many parties on eBay.com.
Possible extensions of our work include the investigation of alternate models for auction dynamics, such as stochastic differential equations (see, e.g., Oksendal 1995; Roberts, Dellaportas, and Papaspiliopoulos 2004; Barndorff-Nielsen and Shepherd 2001) . Another alternative to modeling the price process is through point processes. This would require specifying a process for the bid timings (one such model is the BARISTA process of Shmueli et al. 2007) , and then a process for the bid amounts or, optimally, a combined process for bid timing and amount. The challenges with such an approach are the treatment of the extremely irregular spacing between bids and the incorporation of cross-sectional information, such as auction, item, and seller attributes, into the dynamic model.
On the methodological side, we also propose a new multiplecomparisons test for functional models in the absence of replications. In our context, we use it to test the heterogeneity of dynamics across different auction subpopulations. The advantage of this new test is that it captures both global and local differences between models. This allows for the identification of differences indicative of timing and magnitude rather than merely of overall shape.
APPENDIX: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The choice of our smoothing parameters is governed by reasonable fit. Because a wide range of choices lead to reasonable curve approximations, we investigate the sensitivity of the model fit to different knot choices (Table A .1) and smoothing parameter choices (λ ∈ {.1, . 3, .5, .7, .9, 1, 5, 10, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50}) . Figure A. 1 (top row) shows the estimated coefficient curves ω * and the model fit measures RSQ and F-RATIO for the different sets of knots. Similarly, the bottom row shows these measures for different choices of λ. We can see that although the model is a bit more sensitive to λ, the qualitative nature of the fit does not change by much for different knots or smoothing parameters. [Received December 2006 . Revised October 2007 ϒ1 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 ϒ2 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6.25, 6.5, 6.75, 6.8750, 7 ϒ3 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6.25, 6.5, 6.75, 6.8125, 6.8750, 6.9375, 7 ϒ4 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6.25, 6.5, 6.75, 6.8125, 6.8750, 6.9375, 7
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